Beijing watches, Washington acts: The war and China’s quiet diplomacy
Following the successful US mediation that ended the Israel-Hamas War, secured the release of the hostages, and reoriented regional dynamics toward normalization, a crucial analytical question arises: Where do other major powers, particularly Russia and China, position themselves within this evolving geopolitical landscape?
Russia’s limited visibility in the Gaza context is explained mainly by its preoccupation with its war in Ukraine and confrontation with the West, which have absorbed much of its diplomatic and strategic bandwidth. Moscow’s engagement in the Middle East has thus been confined to rhetorical signaling and limited coordination with regional partners, notably Iran, rather than proactive diplomatic intervention.
By contrast, China’s position is both more complex and more revealing. Over the past two decades, Beijing has developed a distinctive approach to conflict management in the Middle East, which can be conceptualized as quasi-mediation diplomacy – a facilitative rather than interventionist approach designed to preserve neutrality and minimize political risk.
China's diplomatic evolution
While Western powers have often pursued directive or enforcement-based mediation, China has favored a restrained posture centered on convening dialogue, supporting multilateral processes, and emphasizing principles of sovereignty and non-interference. This framework allows Beijing to project an image of constructive impartiality while avoiding the liabilities of deep political involvement.
China’s diplomatic evolution in the Middle East reflects a gradual but deliberate broadening of scope and ambition. In the early 2000s, its engagement was primarily commercial, focused on energy imports and infrastructure projects. During the Arab Spring, Beijing adopted a discourse of sovereignty and stability, opposing regime change while cautiously endorsing dialogue.
From the mid-2010s onward, as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) expanded, China’s diplomacy acquired an explicitly political dimension, linking regional stability to its global connectivity agenda.
By the early 2020s, Beijing began to selectively seek visibility in regional politics, most notably through its facilitative role in the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement. Although Iraq and Oman had painstakingly conducted the substantive negotiations for nearly two years, China’s entry at the final stage reframed a bilateral détente into a display of geopolitical theater that amplified its diplomatic prestige.
However, despite widespread acclaim, Beijing’s involvement remained emblematic of its preference for symbolic engagement over decisive mediation, reinforcing its reputation as a cautious, image-conscious actor rather than a transformative diplomatic power.
This evolution also reflects a broader strategic calculus embedded in China’s pursuit of global legitimacy. Its regional diplomacy serves not only instrumental objectives, such as securing energy routes or protecting commercial interests, but also normative ones, including the projection of an alternative vision of order rooted in multipolarity, non-intervention, and respect for sovereignty.
Its Middle East stance
Within this framework, the Middle East functions as a proving ground for Beijing’s self-styled “responsible power” narrative, where symbolic gestures often substitute for sustained engagement. The result is a form of diplomacy that is deliberately performative: rich in declaratory content yet calibrated to minimize exposure to political risk or reputational damage.
Since 2013, China has repeatedly expressed its willingness to mediate the Israel-Palestinian conflict, framing its interventions within the discourse of impartiality and international legitimacy. It has advanced multiple peace proposals anchored in the two-state paradigm based on the 1967 borders, reaffirming opposition to Israeli settlement expansion, condemning violence against civilians, and advocating for renewed, multilateral political negotiations. However, these initiatives have mainly remained performative, serving image projection and normative positioning more than concrete conflict resolution.
Moreover, Beijing’s declaratory diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian arena exemplifies the limits of its quasi-mediation model. Despite consistent rhetorical appeals for peace, China has refrained from institutionalizing its role, such as by appointing high-level envoys with real leverage or engaging in sustained shuttle diplomacy. Its approach has been characterized by episodic visibility rather than long-term engagement, suggesting that symbolic legitimacy rather than substantive influence remains the primary goal.
This pattern persisted during the Israel-Hamas War. Despite its expanding economic and diplomatic footprint, Beijing’s response was cautious, peripheral, and declaratory. It refrained from proposing a structured peace initiative, instead leveraging its relationships with regional actors and exerting minimal diplomatic pressure. Instead, it reiterated familiar themes – calls for a ceasefire, humanitarian assistance, and a return to negotiations – without accompanying diplomatic action.


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